Mathematics and Cognition Seminar
Spring 2008
Tuesdays 12:15 PM
PSA 206
Seminar Series Schedule:<http://math.la.asu.edu/~tom/cognition/math+cogsched.html>
Cookies and Coffee Starting at 12:00
Note the New Location! <http://math.la.asu.edu/~tom/cognition/maps.html>

On Tuesday, March 25, at 12:15 in ECA 219,
the Mathematics and Cognition Seminar
will present a discussion with

Bruce Rogers,
Department of Mathematics and Statistics

on the topic

"Consensus and Contention: Elections and Social Decisions"

Abstract:

 How well does the outcome of an election reflect the actual wishes of a society? We'll outline the some basic results in the theory of social

choice--the theorems of Arrow, Sen and Gibbard-Satterwait. The most famous result, Arrow's Theorem, states there is no "fair" way to decide an election with 3 or more candidates. But is the notion of fairness as formalized in the theorems applicable to real elections and everyday decisions? We will outline a proof of Arrow's theorem and then discuss wider applications of social choice theorems. That is, do Arrow-like results come into play every time we make decisions?